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TORTS--DRAMSHOP LIABILITY IN ARKANSAS- ILLEGAL SALES OF LIQUOR
To MINORS MAY EXPOSE ALCOHOL VENDORS To EXPENSIVE LIABILITY.
SHANNON v. WILSON, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shannon v. Wilson,' the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a vendor of
alcohol can be held liable for injuries that occur as a result of the illegal sale of
alcohol to a minor.2 This decision overruled Carr v. Turner,3 which adopted
the common law rule of nonliability for liquor vendors and tavern owners.4
For more than thirty years, the court asserted that the proximate cause of any
injuries was the consumption of alcohol rather than its sale.5
In Shannon, two young boys died in an automobile accident after illegally
purchasing and consuming alcohol from a liquor store in Fayetteville,
Arkansas. The trial court dismissed the suit brought against the liquor store
based on the rule from Carr.7 On appeal, the Shannon court imposed a new
rule that created a cause of action under common law negligence against
alcohol vendors for those injured by intoxicated minors.'
The purpose of this note is to discuss the facts involved in Shannon v.
Wilson, examine the history and rationale of the common law rule of
nonliability, analyze the reasoning of the Shannon court in overturning the
common law rule, and explore the significance of the newly established
dramshop liability in Arkansas.
I1. FACTS
On January 28, 1995, Charles Shannon and Jarred Sparks, both thirteen
years old, 9 were passengers in a pickup truck driven by David Farmer, who was
1. 329 Ark. 143,947 S.W.2d 349 (1997).
2. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350. For the purposes of this note,
"minor" shall be the equivalent of "underage" as defined in ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-302(2)
(Michie 1997). "Underage means any person who is under the age of twenty-one (21) years old
and therefore may not legally consume alcoholic beverages in Arkansas." Id.
3. 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
4. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
5. See Milligan v. County Line Liquor, Inc., 289 Ark. 129, 709 S.W.2d 409 (1986). "[I]t
is the consumption of intoxicants, not the sale standing alone, which is the proximate cause of
injuries." Milligan, 289 Ark. at 130, 709 S.W.2d at 410.
6. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 350-51.
7. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
8. See id.
9. There is some dispute among the authorities concerning the ages of the boys. The
court's opinion in Shannon and the Statement of the Case in the appellant's brief state that both
boys were thirteen years old. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350; Appellant's
Brief at 5, Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997) (No. 96-762). Other
authorities, including the Abstract of the appellant's brief, state that Charles Shannon was
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sixteen years old.1 ° Between 7:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. that evening, the boys
purchased beer and malt liquor at the drive-through window of City Liquor in
Fayetteville, Arkansas." The City Liquor employee who sold the alcohol to
the boys never asked to see any form of identification.1
2
When the boys left City Liquor, they began drinking as they drove to St.
Paul, Arkansas.13 Once in St. Paul, David Farmer went into a pool hall, leaving
Charles Shannon and Jarred Sparks in the truck to drink the remaining
alcohol.' 4 Shannon and Sparks soon drove away from the pool hall in the
pickup. 5 Shortly thereafter, the intoxicated boys lost control of the truck.'
6
The Arkansas State Police dispatched a trooper to the accident in Madison
County at approximately 9:10 p.m.'7 The trooper determined that the driver
was unable to negotiate a curve when the truck left the road. 8 The truck
traveled through a fence, hit a telephone pole, and struck a tree. 9 Officers
found Jarred Sparks in the driver's seat of the truck and Charles Shannon in the
passenger's seat.20 Both boys were dead. 2 Chemical analysis of the boys'
blood revealed that Jarred Sparks's blood alcohol content was .10%,22 and
Charles Shannon's blood alcohol content was .07%.23
sixteen years old. See Appellant's Brief at 12, Shannon (No. 96-762); Cpl. M.J. Meadows,
ARKANSAS MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT (No. 95-6500), Jan. 28, 1995
[hereinafter ACCIDENT REPORT].
10. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
11. See id. The boys purchased a six-pack of beer and a six pack of Zima. See
Appellant's Brief at 12, Shannon (No. 96-762).
12. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
13. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 350. It is approximately twenty-nine
miles from Fayetteville, Arkansas to St. Paul, Arkansas. See 1996 HIGHWAY MAP OF
ARKANSAS, Arkansas State Highway And Transportation Department.




18. See ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 9. The report stated that the Aqua-colored 1993
Ford Ranger pickup driven by Jarred Sparks lost control on a curve 7/10 of a mile east of the
Madison County/Washington County line on Arkansas State Highway 16. It was raining that
evening, and the road was wet. The report indicated that the truck traveled approximately 390
feet after leaving the highway before coming to rest against a tree. See ACCIDENT REPORT,
supra note 9. The accident occurred approximately thirteen miles from where the boys left
David Farmer in St. Paul. See 1996 HIGHWAY MAP OF ARKANSAS, supra note 13.
19. See ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 9.
20. See ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 9.
21. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 351.
22. It is unlawful for any person who is under the age of twenty one years old "to operate
or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle if at that time there was one-fiftieth of one
percent (0.02%)... by weight of alcohol in the person's blood .... " ARK CODE ANN. § 5-65-
303(b) (Michie 1997).
23. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 351.
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Charles Shannon's father filed suit against City Liquor.2 4 He alleged that
City Liquor was negligent in selling alcohol to the three minors.' The plaintiff
asserted that it was foreseeable that minors who purchase liquor at a drive-
through window would drive the vehicle in an impaired state, thus endangering
themselves and others.26
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on
which relief could be granted.27 On appeal, Shannon asked the court to change
the law in Arkansas and allow a cause of action against a vendor who
knowingly sells alcohol to minors. 2' The court then overturned the rule set
forth in Carr v. Turner which denied the existence of dramshop liability in
Arkansas in the absence of a statute.29
III. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this Background section is to dissect the history and the
rationale of the common law rule of nonliability as against alcohol vendors,
and also to explore the societal changes that caused that rule to slip into
minority status. At common law, one injured by the acts of an intoxicated
person had no cause of action available against the person who sold the
alcohol.3° Therefore, alcohol vendors owed no duty to those injured by
intoxicated patrons.3 Proximate causation was the barrier to recovery.32
Courts subscribed to the theory that the consumption of the alcohol, rather than
the sale, was the proximate cause of any injuries. 33 Most jurisdictions have
24. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 351. Shannon filed suit against L.K.
Wilson and Elizabeth Ashworth, individually and as partners of City Liquor. See Shannon, 329
Ark. at 143, 947 S.W.2d at 349. City Liquor was located at 1428 S. School Street in
Fayetteville, Arkansas. See Appellant's Brief at 12, Shannon (No. 96-762).
25. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 351.
26. See id.
27. See id. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss under ARK. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6) before
Judge Tom Keith in Benton County Circuit Court. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d
at 351. "For the purpose of deciding the [12(b)(6)I motion, the factual allegations in the
complaint are accepted as true and viewed most favorably to the claimant." DAVID NEWBERN,
ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 11-7, at 143 (2d ed. 1993).
28. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 147, 947 S.W.2d at 351.
29. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 160, 947 S.W.2d at 358.
30. See Michael D. Morrison & Gregory N. Woods, An Examination of the Duty Concept:
Has it Evolved in Otis Engineering v. Clark?, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 375, 407 (1984).
31. See id. Injured persons had only a cause of action against the intoxicated tortfeasor.
See id.
32. See W. Barton Chapin, Liquor Vendors and Social Hosts: Are They Immune From
Civil Liability?, Wis. L. Rev., 65-Dec. 1992, at 11, 12.
33. See Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A
Comparative Study, 8 REV. LITG. 1, 3 (1988). "Voluntary consumption of alcohol, rather than
the mere furnishing of alcohol, is the proximate cause of any subsequent injury as a matter of
1998]
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abrogated the strict nonliability rule based either on a statute or a judicially
imposed cause of action.34
A. Nineteenth Century Attitudes Toward Alcohol Influenced Legislatures
In the mid-nineteenth century, many state legislatures passed civil damage
acts, popularly known as Dramshop Acts. 35 Dramshop acts traditionally
imposed strict liability on the seller of alcoholic beverages for injuries caused
by intoxicated persons.36 These acts were promulgated during the Temperance
Movement primarily to regulate morals rather than to provide for tort
compensation. 37 Nonetheless, many of the acts did, and others were revised to,
compensate innocent victims of an intoxicated tortfeasor3a
law. Subsequent injury is not deemed foreseeable to the alcohol dispenser due to its remoteness
from the act of dispensing." Id. "The principle is epitomized in the truism that there may be
sales without intoxication, but no intoxication without drinking." Collier v. Stamatis, 162 P.2d
125, 127 (Ariz. 1945).
34. See Madeline E. Kelly, Liquor Liability and Blame-Shifting Defenses: Do they Mix?
69 MARQ. L. REv. 217, 218 (1986). The basis for imposing dramshop liability includes
statutes that expressly impose such liability, alcohol regulatory statutes that are interpreted by
courts to establish negligence per se, and common law negligence theory. See id.
35. See Sipes, supra note 33, at 3. A Dramshop is defined as "[a] drinking saloon, where
liquors are sold to be drunk on the premises.... A place where spirituous liquors are sold by
the dram or the drink; a barroom." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 583 (4
h ed. 1951).
36. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 81,
at 581 (5th ed. 1984). For strict liability,
[t]he basis of the liability is the defendant's intentional behavior in exposing those
in his vicinity to... risk.... [S]trict liability often is said to be imposed 'without
fault.... .' [T]he defendant is not at 'fault' because he has only done a reasonable
thing in a reasonable way, and.., he is liable notwithstanding.
Id. § 75, at 537.
37. See Charles E. Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 ALA. LAW. 409 (1967).
The Dram Shop Acts are generally considered to be the byproduct of the prohibition
movement. They provided the prohibitionists a measure of control over a 'legal, but
ill favored trade . . . .' The new social consciousness which was influencing
education and religion in the [18]70's found in the Temperance Movement a
concrete issue upon which it could lavish its energy .... The definite goal at which
the temperance forces were aiming was the enactment of a law which would
adequately express their attitude toward the liquor traffic, and which would provide
against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors .... Although the
National Temperance Movement did not effectuate the 18th Amendment of the
Constitution until 1919, prior to that time prohibitionists lobbied State Legislatures
to pass Dram Shop Acts designed to control liquor traffic and to provide against the
evils ... of intoxicating liquors.
Id. (citations omitted).
38. See Sipes, supra note 33, at 3 n.10. Wisconsin's 1849 dramshop act was cited as
being the first of the dramshop acts. The Wisconsin act, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West 1974)
(Repealed 1982), created a cause of action for persons injured by a drunken minor or habitual
drunkard against the seller of the alcohol, provided the seller had been notified by the spouse
[Vol. 20
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Prior to Prohibition, Arkansas also had a dramshop act that required a
saloon keeper to post a $2,000 bond to pay for damages or injuries resulting
from the sale of alcohol." Even under the regime of the Arkansas dramshop
act, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to establish the sale of alcohol as
being the proximate cause of injuries caused by or to intoxicated patrons.'
The Arkansas Supreme Court heard very few cases under the saloon
keeper's bond act and applied a narrow interpretation of the act in each of
them.4' The court's strict interpretation of the act resulted in no statutory
liability for monetary damages for injuries caused by the sale of alcohol. 2 In
Peter Anderson & Co. v. Diaz,43 a drunken saloon patron filed suit after the
bartender and another patron set the plaintiff's foot on fire while he was still in
the saloon." The court held that the sale of the alcohol was not the proximate
cause of the injuries and denied compensation to the injured patron based on
the bond statute.45 In Bolen v. Still,46 a man fell from his horse and died after
becoming intoxicated from alcohol purchased from the defendant. 47 The court
again refused to recognize the sale of alcohol as the proximate cause of the
death and denied recovery.48
After the repeal of Prohibition, many states, including Arkansas, repealed
their dramshop statutes.49 Courts that addressed the issue of dramshop liability
in the absence of a statute generally held that although such a rule may be
desirable, it was the responsibility of the state legislatures to create it.5 ° A few
or guardian of the drunkard not to sell alcohol to that person. The Wisconsin act was repealed
in 1982. See Sipes, supra note 33, at 3-4 n.10.
39. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 890, 385 S.W.2d at 657 (citing KIRBY'S DIGEST § 5121 (1904)
(repealed, 1915 Ark. Acts 30)); see also Robert V. Light, Note, Liability of Vendor to Third
Parties for Injury Caused by Sale of Intoxicants, 9 ARK. L. REV. 179, 181 (1954-55).
40. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 890,385 S.W.2d at 657 (citing Bolen v. Still, 123 Ark. 308, 185
S.W. 811 (1916); Peter Anderson & Co. v. Diaz, 77 Ark. 606, 92 S.W. 861 (1906); Gage v.
Harvey, 66 Ark. 68,48 S.W. 898 (1898)).
41. See Light, supra note 39, at 181-82 (citing Gage v. Harvey, 66 Ark. 68, 48 S.W. 898
(1898); McPherson v. Simmons, 63 Ark. 593,40 S.W. 78 (1897); Grant v. Owens, 55 Ark.
49, 17 S.W. 338 (1891)). The court refused recovery in these cases holding that the statute
under which the cases were brought failed to provide a civil remedy. See Light, supra note 39,
at 181.
42. See Light, supra note 39, at 181.
43. 77 Ark. 606, 92 S.W. 861 (1906).
44. See Peter Anderson & Co., 77 Ark. at 606-07, 92 S.W. at 862.
45. See Peter Anderson & Co., 77 Ark. at 607-08, 92 S.W. at 862.
46. 123 Ark. 308, 185 S.W. 811 (1916).
47. See Bolen, 123 Ark. at 309, 185 S.W. at 811.
48. SeeBolen, 123 Ark. at 312, 185 S.W. at 812.
49. See Daniel E. Johnson, Drunken Driving-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor
of Intoxicating Liquor, 37 N.D. L. REv. 317, 321 (1961-62). "The collapse of temperance as
a crusade... has stripped civil damage legislation of powerful support during a period in which
the jural notion of liability based on proved fault has supplanted absolute liability...." Id.
50. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 892, 385 S.W.2d at 658. "It may be that a Dramshop Act is to.
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courts allowed a common law cause of action by the wives, or widows, of
known drunkards when an alcohol vendor continued to sell alcohol to their
husbands after being asked not to serve them.5 These cases were distinguish-
able from true dramshop liability52 because they were based on common law
loss of consortium claims by a spouse against one who knowingly sells "habit-
forming drugs" to the other spouse. 3
B. The Need For a Dramshop Renaissance in the Twentieth Century
National prohibition ended in 1933. 54 In the years that followed, states
began regulating the sale and distribution of intoxicating liquors.5 Automo-
biles became commonplace in America, thus increasing the damage that could
be caused by an intoxicated person. 6 The devastation caused by drunken
drivers prompted many jurisdictions to rethink their positions of nonliability 7
Courts have taken judicial notice of the high costs of drinking and driving.5
be desired, but such a measure should be the result of legislative action rather than of judicial
interpretation." Id.
51. See Pratt v. Daly, 104 P.2d 147 (Ariz. 1940).
52. True dramshop liability availed a cause of action to an injured third party, rather than
the spouse of the tortfeasor alone. See, e.g., WIS. STAT ANN. § 176.35 (West 1974) (repealed
1982).
53. See Pratt, 104 P.2d at 150-152. Recovery in marital services cases tended to focus on
the loss of protected interests, "but it eventually became clear that the husband's recovery for
loss of consortium ... included damages for loss of sexual attentions, society, and affection."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 125, at 931. Modem loss of consortium claims are available
to both spouses. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 125, at 931-32.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing amend. XVIII).
55. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 321. As compared with the dramshop acts of the
nineteenth century, modem regulatory statutes governing alcohol more strictly control the
distribution and sale of intoxicants than the Temperance Era legislators ever imagined. See
Johnson, supra note 49, at 321.
56. See, e.g., Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54, 65 (Idaho 1969) (Prather, J., concurring
specially in the result, dissenting in part), overruled by Alegria v. Paynock, 619 P.2d 135 (Idaho
1980). The rule of nonliability was adequate in the days when transportation moved more
slowly because of the means of transport. See id. (Prather, J., concurring specially in the result,
dissenting in part). The old rule may not be suitable when an intoxicated person is "operating
a machine that requires quick response of mind and muscle and capable of producing mass
death and destruction .... " Id. (Prather, J., concurring specially in the result, dissenting in
part).
57. See, e.g., Elizabeth McFarland, Teen Drunks Could Cost Liquor Seller: Court Says
Stores May be Held Liable, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 24, 1997, at IA (quoting Bruce
Mulkey of Rogers, Ark., attorney for the appellants) (The court "looked at the circumstances
and decided that the common law rule was outdated in the days of drive-through windows and
steel contraptions capable of going 100 mph.").
58. See, e.g., Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120, 122 (S.D. 1982). In overruling
the common law rule, the Supreme Court of South Dakota took judicial notice of the high
percentage of traffic accidents in which alcohol is involved. See id. The court also recognized
[Vol. 20
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In the last thirty years, courts have reversed the trend of non-liability that
was based on the plaintiff's inability to establish proximate cause.59 Liability
may be imposed on a vendor who sells alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
driver in two ways. 6° First, civil liability may be imposed under a dramshop
liability statute when the sale of alcoholic beverages results in harm to a third
party due to the patron's intoxication.1 Second, liability may be judicially
imposed based upon either negligence per se or common law negligence
principles.
62
1. Liability Based on Violation of a Statute
Every state, as well as Washington D.C., has some form of alcohol
beverage control act.63 These acts generally state that it is a criminal misde-
meanor to sell or to give alcohol to minors or a visibly intoxicated person.
64
Most courts have held that a violation of such an act by a vendor is either
evidence of negligence or negligence per se. 65 The jury is then allowed to
determine whether the violation of the act was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries, as the court declared in Shannon.'
2. Judicially Imposed Liability
In 1959, two cases were decided that ushered in the modem era of
common law dramshop liability. The courts in Waynick v. Chicago 's Last
Department Store67 and Rappaport v. Nichols6s both found liability based on
the violation of a duty created by a criminal statute and the common law
principle of negligence per se.69
that "in 1981 alone, 62% of South Dakota's traffic fatalities were alcohol related." Id. Based
on "this tragic waste of life," the court overruled its prior rule of nonliability and noted that the
state legislature was free to disagree if it chose to do so. See id.
59. See Sipes, supra note 33, at 6.
60. See Sipes, supra note 33, at 7.
61. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 217-218.
62. See Kelly, supra note 34, at 218.
63. See Julius F. Lang, Jr. & John J. McGrath, Comment, Third Party Liability for
Drunken Driving: When "One For the Road" Becomes One For the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REv.
1119, 1137 n.84 (1983-84).
64. See, e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-209 (Michie 1996) (making it unlawful to sell or give
alcohol to a minor, habitual drunkard, or intoxicated person).
65. See Morrison & Woods, supra note 30, at 410. See also cases cited infra note 118.
66. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 160, 947 S.W.2d at 357-358.
67. 269 F.2d 322 (70 Cir. 1959).
68. 156 A.2d I (N.J. 1959).
69. See Morrison & Woods, supra note 30, at 411-12.
19981
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Waynick began as a diversity action against three liquor store owners
based on sales to a person who became intoxicated and was subsequently
involved in a car accident.7° The trial court dismissed the complaint.7' The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that no applicable state statute existed,
so the court turned to the Michigan common law.7' The Waynick court then
recited the common law rule of nonliability against vendors of alcohol.7 3 It
also noted that pertinent penal statutes may be viewed as imposing a duty upon
the vendor, the violation of which may constitute negligence per se.74 The
court allowed a cause of action based on the violation of the statutorily
imposed duty of care.75
In Rappaport v. Nichols, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a
landmark decision based upon a rationale similar to that used in Waynick.
76
Even though New Jersey had repealed its dramshop law, the court allowed a
common-law negligence action against a tavern that served an intoxicated
minor who was subsequently involved in a fatal collision.7 7 Robert Nichols,
who was eighteen years old, became intoxicated in several taverns and then
drove an automobile.78 Nichols collided with a car driven by Arthur
Rappaport, killing Mr. Rappaport.79
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that selling alcohol to minors or
visibly intoxicated persons was not only illegal, but could constitute negligence
as well.80 The court applied common law negligence principles to the issues
of duty and the risk of harm. 8' The court also noted that liquor licensees
operate their businesses by way of privilege rather than right." The court held
70. See Waynick, 269 F.2d at 323-24.
71. See id. at 324.
72. See id. at 324-25.
73. See id. at 325.
74. See id. The court stated that as a matter of law, one becomes the proximate cause of
injuries later suffered by a third party as a result of the sale of liquor, when one sells'liquor in
wanton disregard to one's duty to third parties. See id. (citations omitted). A common law
negligence suit may then be actionable against the vendor. See id. (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 326.
76. See Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
77. See Sharp, supra note 37, at 415-16.
78. See Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 3.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 9.
81. See id. at 8. "Negligence is tested by whether the reasonably prudent person at the
time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or
dangers to others." Id. The court said that it is reasonable for a tavern keeper who sells alcohol
to a minor to foresee the harm that may be caused by such service, when he knows or should
know that the person is a minor, or one who is already intoxicated. See id. The court stated that
the state legislature categorically denied sales to minors, as a class, based on their unique
vulnerability to the effects of intoxicants. See id.
82. See Rappaport, 156 A.2d at 10.
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that the violation of the regulating statutes constituted evidence of negligence
on the part of the alcohol vendors that could be admitted at trial.83
B. The Rule of Nonliability in Arkansas: Carr v. Turner
Six years after the Waynick and Rappaport decisions, the Arkansas
Supreme Court addressed a similar issue of alcohol vendor liability. 4 On
September 22, 1961, Ruby Turner consumed alcohol at the Southern Club in
Hot Springs, Arkansas.85 The alcohol sale violated a state statute that required
liquor be sold only in an unbroken package for consumption off the premises.
86
Ruby Turner left the club visibly intoxicated and drove her automobile into a
parked taxicab, injuring Everette Carr.87
The Arkansas Supreme Court explored the possibility of liability against
the server of the alcohol and recited the common law rule of nonliability.88 The
court then questioned whether two particular statutes had changed the common
law rule in Arkansas.89 The first was the unbroken package statute.90 The court
concluded that the General Assembly intended for this statute to discourage a
resurgence of saloons in Arkansas and not to impose civil liability on an
alcohol vendor.9' The court also examined a statute that declared it a
misdemeanor to sell or give liquor to a minor, an habitual drunkard, or an
intoxicated person.92 The court asserted, however, that most states, if not all,
had similar statutes and their courts had rarely construed them to change the
common law rule and establish tort liability.93 The court noted that a small
minority of jurisdictions allowed the common law rule of nonliability to be
abrogated by similar statutes and cited the rule set forth in Pratt v. Daly.94 In
Pratt, the court held a tavern keeper liable for loss of consortium when he
ignored a woman's warnings not to sell liquor to her husband.95 The court also
83. See id. at 9.
84. See Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
85. See id. at 889, 385 S.W.2d at 657.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 890, 385 S.W.2d at 657.
89. See id. at 890-91, 385 S.W.2d at 657.
90. See Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 890-91, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1965).
91. See id. This statute distinguished one form of intoxicant from another. See id.
Restaurants and taverns could sell beer for consumption on the premises. See id. Such was not
the case for liquor. See id. This apparent lack of consistency in the law's rationale led the court
to believe that the legislature did not intend to impose tort liability through this statute on those
who sold whiskey while immunizing those who sold beer. See id.
92. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 891, 385 S.W.2d at 657.
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text.
95. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 891, 385 S.W.2d at 658.
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cited Rappaport v. Nichols, but it stated that there was a significant distinction
between Pratt, Rappaport, and Carr.96 The court found difficulty with the
wording of the Arkansas statute in that it was unlikely to limit liability only to
those in the business of selling alcohol. 97 The court refused to extend liability
to the dramshop owner and stated that although a dramshop act may be sound
policy, it was the responsibility of the legislature to institute such a policy
rather than the court.9s
In the years after Carr, the Arkansas Supreme Court repeatedly held that
tavern owners were not responsible for injuries that intoxicated patrons caused
to third parties.99 Each time the court considered the effects of a statute
restricting alcohol sales to minors, the court refused to recognize that such
statutes imposed a duty on tavern owners that abrogated the common law rule
of nonliability.i10
In Mann v. Orrell,'' the court unanimously held that it did not recognize
dramshop liability." 2 In that case the plaintiff alleged that the owner of a
tavern failed to use ordinary care in keeping his premises safe by allowing
minors to be served alcohol.'0 3 The court found this attempt to expand the
tavern owner's liability unpersuasive. 04
The common law rule stood until it was overruled by the Shannon
decision.'0 5 Only two years after Mann, the court held that the regulatory
nature of liquor licenses, and the statutes prohibiting the sale of alcohol to
minors or intoxicated persons, imposed a duty of care to patrons and third
96. See id. at 891-92, 385 S.W.2d at 658.
97. See id. The Arkansas statute was not so narrow as to only include the sale of alcohol
to minors or inebriates, thus only affecting those in the business of selling alcohol. See id. The
language of the statute addressed giving away alcohol to a minor or an inebriate. See id. Thus,
if this statute was interpreted to impose tort liability, that liability would extend to "a person
entertaining his friends in his home." Id.
98. See id. at 892, 385 S.W.2d at 658.
99. See, e.g., First Am. Bank of N. Little Rock v. Associated Hosts, Inc., 292 Ark. 445,
730 S.W.2d 496 (1987); Yancey v. The Beverage House of Little Rock, 291 Ark. 217, 723
S.W.2d 826 (1987).
100. See Milligan v. County Line Liquor, Inc., 289 Ark. 129, 130, 709 S.W.2d 409, 410
(1986).
101. 322 Ark. 701, 912 S.W.2d 1 (1995).
102. See Mann, 322 Ark. at 705, 912 S.W.2d at 3. "As we have said many times, we will
not impose liability on a tavern owner for injuries resulting from the wrongdoer's intoxication."
Id.
103. See Mann, 322 Ark. at 703, 912 S.W.2d at 2.
104. See Mann, 322 Ark. at 704-05, 912 S.W.2d at 3.
105. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 160, 947 S.W.2d at 358.
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parties injured by intoxicated patrons. 0 6 The make-up of the court had
changed, and therefore, so did its analysis of old rules.0 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN SHANNON V. WILSON.
In Shannon v. Wilson,'I 8 the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the
question of whether Arkansas should allow a cause of action against a vendor
of alcohol who illegally sold intoxicants to minors for injuries caused by those
minors while intoxicated." The court had held consistently that no such cause
of action existed."1 Chief Justice Arnold wrote for the majority in Shannon,
overturning the common law rule of nonliability for alcohol vendors."' This
Analysis section will examine the reasoning of the court in its decision to
discard the common law rule in favor of the modem majority rule. The section
will also address the dissent's concern that the court was blindly following the
majority position among the states."'
A. Majority Opinion
The court began by examining the rationale for the common law rule of
nonliability." 3 When the rule was created, transportation consisted primarily
of walking or riding in a horse drawn carriage; 114 therefore, the sale of alcohol
to a minor or intoxicated person created no unreasonable risk to the public."15
Such is not the case today when the vast majority of transportation is by motor
106. See id.; McFarland, supra note 57, at IA (quoting Bruce Mulkey of Rogers, Arkansas,
attorney for the appellants) ( "It's the first time in the history of this state that providing alcohol
has created a jury question as to whether or not there's negligence[.]").
107. Four of the seven Justices that sat on the Mann court also heard Shannon v. Wilson:
Justices David Newbern, Tom Glaze, Donald L. Corbin, and Robert L. Brown. See 322 Ark.
at v (1995). There were, however, three newly elected Justices: Justices W.H. "Dub" Arnold
(Chief Justice), Annablle Clinton Imber, and Ray Thornton. See 329 Ark. at ii (1997).
108. 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349.
109. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
110. See id. at 148-49, 947 S.W.2d at 351-52 (citing Mann v. Orrell, 322 Ark. 701, 912
S.W.2d 1 (1995); First Am. Bank of N. Little Rock v. Associated Hosts, Inc., 292 Ark. 445,
730 S.W.2d 496 (1987); Yancey v. The Beverage House of Little Rock, Inc., 291 Ark. 217,723
S.W.2d 826 (1987); Milligan v. County Line Liquor, Inc., 289 Ark. 129, 709 S.W.2d 409
(1986); and Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965)).
Ill. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 146, 947 S.W.2d at 350.
112. See id. at 162-63, 947 S.W.2d at 359 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 149, 947 S.W.2d at 352.




vehicle.'1 16 The court recognized that drinking and driving constitutes a great
risk to the public at large.117
When Carr v. Turner embraced the rule of nonliability, the court noted
that the majority rule in the United States at the time was to deny such a cause
of action."18 This is also not the case today. In Shannon, Chief Justice Arnold
listed thirty-seven jurisdictions that allow the question of dramshop liability to
be a factual question for the jury to answer." 9  As those jurisdictions
reconsidered their positions of nonliability, Carr became part of the minority
that it had shunned:
120
In the years after Carr, the court held repeatedly that the imposition of
liability on alcohol vendors may be a desirable rule, but it was the legislature's
responsibility to change the common law rule of nonliability. 121 In Shannon,
the court reiterated its belief that legislation is the preferred means of changing
the law. 2 In the face of legislative inaction, however, the court addressed the
116. See id. The court stated that "[t]he reality of modem life is evidenced by the fact that
most drinking establishments and liquor stores provide patrons parking lots." Id.
117. See Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 150, 947 S.W.2d 349, 352 (1997) (citing the
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, INTERIM REPORT TO THE NATION (Dec. 13, 1995)
(noting that "[o]ver 250,000 people died ... in alcohol-related motor-vehicle accidents...
between 1980-1990")).
118. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 891, 385 S.W.2d at 657. "[C]ases finding liability are so few
that they may be reviewed quickly." Id.
119. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 153-55,947 S.W.2d at 354-55 (citing Nazareno v. Urie, 638
P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200 (Ariz. 1983); Strang v. Cabrol, 691
P.2d 1013 (Cal. 1984); Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 532 P.2d 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155
So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Sutter v. Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1985); Ono v. Applegate, 612
P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980); Alegria v. Payonk, 619 P.2d 135 (Idaho 1980); Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1966);
Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977); Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So. 2d 494 (La. 1979);
Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 18 (Mass. 1968); Thaut v. Finley, 213 N.W.2d 820
(Mich. 1973); Trail v. Christian, 231 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368
So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329 (Mont. 1986); Ramsey v. Anctil, 211 A.2d 900
(N.H. 1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959); Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269
(N.M. 1982); Berkeley v. Park, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. 1965); Hutchens v. Hankins, 303
S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Mason v. Roberts, 294N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1973); Brigance v.
Velvet Dove Restr., 725 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1986); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 198 A.2d
550 (Pa. 1964); Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 48 S.E.2d 324 (S.C. 1948); Walz v. City
of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982); Mitchell v. Ketner, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1964); Poole v. El Chico Corp., 713 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Rees v. Albertson's,
Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978); Callan v. O'Neil, 578 P.2d 890 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978);
Anderson v. Moulder, 394 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1990); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis.
1984); McClellan v.- Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983)).
120. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 152, 947 S.W.2d at 353.
121. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 148, 947 S.W.2d at 351.
122. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 149, 947 S.W.2d at 352.
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question on its own. 123 The court then reaffirmed its power to address public
policy issues to which the legislature has been inattentive.' 24 The court cited
Parish v. Pitts,'2' wherein the court asserted that it is uniquely within the power
of the judicial branch to change the common law. 26 The court went further and
recognized a duty on its part to change common law doctrines that have
become unjust given societal changes. 1
27
. The Shannon court found unpersuasive the common law principle that the
consumption of alcohol, rather than the sale of the alcohol, is the proximate
cause of any resulting injuries. 2 ' The court stated that this rationale was no
longer sound. 129  The mere existence of an intervening cause does not
automatically relieve the original actor of liability. 3 0 Therefore, since causation
is a question of fact, the rule espoused in Carr deprives juries of the ability to
perform their basic function.'3
Finally, the court explored the existence of a duty on the part of alcohol
vendors to protect minors. 132 The legislature has declared it necessary to obtain
a license to sell alcohol' and that a high duty of care is thereby imposed.
34
The court also recognized the existence of statutes designed to protect minors
as a class from the sale of alcohol. 35 The court held that these statutes impose
a high duty of care on the vendors of alcohol and that the violation of those
statutes may be evidence of negligence on the part of an alcohol vendor. 1
3 6
123. See id. "Despite this Court's preference for legislative action, there has been no action
directly addressing this troublesome question; so, we will address this issue now." Id.
124. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 150, 947 S.W.2d at 352.
125. 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968).
126. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 151, 947 S.W.2d at 353 (citing Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. at
1239, 429 S.W.2d at 45).
127. See id.
128. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 157, 947 S.W.2d at 356.
129. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 157-58, 947 S.W.2d at 356.
130. See id. "The intervening act, itself negligent, need not be a superseding cause if its
occurrence would be foreseeable to the person whose conduct is subject to inquiry.... A
defendant may reasonably be required to guard against a foreseeable intervening cause whether
or not this cause is itself negligent." Johnson, supra note 49, at 323-24 (citations omitted).
131. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 156, 947 S.W.2d at 356.
132. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 158, 947 S.W.2d at 356-57.
133. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-218(a) (Michie Repealed 1996).
134. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-218(a)-(b) (Michie Repealed 1996). The licensee is held
to "a high duty of care in the operation of the licensed establishment... [and shall] operate the
business wherein alcoholic beverages are sold.., in a manner which is in the public interest,
and does not endanger the public health, welfare, or safety." Id.
135. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 159, 947 S.W.2d at 357. Arkansas law states that anyone
who knowingly or otherwise furnishes alcohol to a minor for monetary gain shall be guilty of
a Class D felony. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-202(b)(1)(2)(A) (Michie Repealed 1996).
136. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 160, 947 S.W.2d at 357 (citing Rogers v. Stillman, 223 Ark.
779, 268 S.W.2d 614 (1954)).
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In summary, the court recognized that public policy needs have changed
since the adoption of the rule in Carr; the Court has the power to change the
common law when the legislature fails to do so; a duty exists on the part of
alcohol vendors to protect minors; thus, a cause of action may be stated against
alcohol vendors in which proximate cause and negligence shall be questions
for a jury to answer.
137
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Newbem stated that it is true that the court has a responsibility to
overturn a prior decision if that decision was made in error or becomes
outdated.'38 He asserted that such was not the case here. 39 The rule in Carr
was not outmoded; it was unpopular. 40  The dissent suggested that
transportation has changed very little since the court first stated the rule, and
then reaffirmed it over the years.'4 ' The dissent feared that the only difference
between the past and the present was the weight of the majority. 42 The dissent
noted that the court carefully analyzed the opinion in Carr and did not follow
the majority mindlessly. 4 3 The court asserted in Carr, and in the cases that
followed, that the matter of liability was best left to the legislature. 44 The
dissent also questioned the majority's attempt to narrow the effects of its
opinion to the illegal sale of alcohol to minors. 45 The legislature has not
limited criminal sanctions to the sale of alcohol, but also includes giving
alcohol to minors or inebriates as proscribed behavior.146 Justice Newbern
137. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 156-61, 947 S.W.2d at 356-58.
138. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 161,947 S.W.2d at 358 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
139. See id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
140. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 163, 947 S.W.2d at 359 (Newbern, J., dissenting). "Being
in a majority, like being politically correct, offers superficial comfort, but it may not be right
in the long run." Id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
141. See id. (Newbem, J., dissenting). "Citizens were not riding horses up to package-store
drive-in windows in 1965, 1987, and 1995." Id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
142. See id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
143. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 162, 947 S.W.2d at 359 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
144. See id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
145. See id. (Newbem, J., dissenting).
146. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 162, 947 S.W.2d at 358-359 (Newbern, J. dissenting).
(citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-201 (Michie Repealed 1996)). This statute makes it a
misdemeanor to sell, give away, or otherwise distribute alcohol to a minor "whether it is done
knowingly or not." See id.
Some courts reason that while such statutes prohibit 'giving away' alcohol to
intoxicated persons or minors, the legislative intent was nevertheless to regulate
licensed businesses and not to set a standard of care for social hosts. Other courts
have refused to scrutinize liquor control statutes with such a narrow focus. These
courts have concluded that the legislative purpose is to protect the public and,
specifically, intoxicated minors or persons themselves from the harm threatened by
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argued that the new rule the court enunciated may not be restricted to those
who sell alcohol, legally or illegally.'47 If the public policy the majority relied
upon is to protect the public from intoxicated minors, the source of the minor's




Shannon v. Wilson has opened doors to litigation that have always been
closed in Arkansas. Other states that have experienced the demise of the
common law rule of nonliability saw the proverbial floodgates open for the
flow of lawsuits and dollars. 5° For those injured by intoxicated drivers who
purchased or consumed alcohol illegally, the new rule provides relief from the
harsh common law barrier to recovery. For those persons trying to operate a
legal, profitable business selling liquor, the new rule can be frightening and
expensive. Finally, for those who wish to serve cocktails to their guests in their
own home, the new rule may leave them feeling understandably vulnerable.
The gamut of insurance consequences is surely to be the most visible
aspect of the significance of Shannon. Many insurance companies do not offer
liquor liability coverage, and those that do are offering such coverage at a high
premium.'5' Of course, the cost of insurance is a business expense that can be
passed on to the consumer.'52 This rationale addresses concerns of balancing
the interests of a business owner who can redistribute the costs of liability and
the interests of an innocent plaintiff. 53  In the absence of the insured,
the service of alcohol to such persons regardless of whether the alcohol is served or
sold by a bartender, a liquor store or a social host.
Kelly, supra note 34, at 219 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
147. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 162, 947 S.W.2d at 359 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
148. See id. (Newbern, J., dissenting).
149. See Carr, 238 Ark. at 892, 385 S.W.2d, at 658; see supra notes 97 and 144 and
accompanying text.
150. See James M. Goldberg, One For the Road, Liquor Liability Broadens, A.B.A. J., June
1987, at 84-86. A wrongful death claim in Michigan against an alcohol vendor ended with a
$10.8 million settlement, which included a $3 million cash payment; also, two widows in Ohio
brought a $24 million suit against a tavern after their husbands' deaths in a car accident. See
id. at 84. "Though definitive statistics are not available, some knowledgeable observers peg the
growth rate of alcohol server liability litigation at 300 percent a year." Id.
151. See id. at 86. "My regular carrier refused to write it. I had to switch to a different
company.... [I]t's going to be high. But I feel like I have to have it. I think everybody in the
state who owns a liquor store will have to have it." Doug Smith, The Cost of Selling Alcohol
Just Went Up, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at 8 (quoting a Little Rock liquor store owner in
response to Shannon).
152. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 330.
153. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 330.
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vicariously liable alcohol vendor, the innocent plaintiff may well suffer at the
hands of a guilty, but judgment proof, tortfeasor.154 Of course, this logic does
not seem so fair and equitable to the alcohol vendor. The liquor and insurance
lobbies have fought back in several states, and anti-dramshop legislation has
been enacted in an attempt to limit liquor liability.1 55 One leverage point on
this side of the movement is the privilege of insurance companies to choose not
to insure, thus leaving the state to form insurance pools.
56
For the average citizen, the establishment of social host liability in
Arkansas may be a frightening consequence of Shannon. The dissenting
opinion reiterated the problem with basing dramshop liability on the current
statute in Arkansas.157 The Arkansas statute that makes it a felony to sell
alcohol to minors also makes it unlawful to give away alcohol.'58 This may be
interpreted as opening the area of social host liability, as has been the case in
other jurisdictions.'59 Social host liability, however, is a remedy that courts
rarely make available because it is contrary to the general expectations of
American society.160
The significance of Shannon has yet to be seen. Surely, trial lawyers will
be anxious to cut their teeth on this new avenue of liability; the insurance
industry will seek to limit its liability to injured plaintiffs; and the average
social host may hold his breath, and perhaps his bottle, until the court speaks
on the issue again. The majority in Shannon stated that it made its decision in
the light of legislative inaction and invited the legislature to speak up if it
154. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 330.
155. See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 88. "The trend in legislation is toward limiting
liquor liability. Legislatures in nineteen states enacted new laws or amended existing dramshop
statutes in 1986. Most of these measures had the effect of limiting commercial server or social
host liability in some form." Goldberg, supra note 149, at 88 (emphasis supplied).
156. See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 86. At least three states have established "state-
operated insurance pools" in order to distribute the costs of and coverage for liquor liability.
See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 86.
157. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 162, 947 S.W.2d at 359 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
158. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-202(a)(1) (Michie Repealed 1996).
159. See Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or.
1971).
160. See Smith, supra note 151, at 8 (quoting Prof. Andrew J. McClurg, of the UALR
School of Law) ( "[S]ocial host liability ... [is] rare .... The vast majority of courts have
rejected it. They make the distinction that a commercial enterprise is in a much better position
to insure against the risks.").
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disagreed with the court's holding. 161 It will be interesting to see what, if
anything, the legislature has to say.
Dustin Blake McDaniel
161. See Shannon, 329 Ark. at 151, 947 S.W.2d at 353. "There has been legislative action.
The Legislature has chosen not to pass a law." McFarland, supra note 57, at IA (quoting Bill
Brady, lobbyist for the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States) (emphasis added).
Dramshop bills were introduced to the General Assembly on several occasions, but none ever
passed through the House Rules Committee. See McFarland, supra note 57, at IA.
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